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The aim of this study is to investigate gender relations and the 
family in contemporary China. More specifically it seeks to 
contextualise the contemporary Chinese family within a socio-
historical, political and cultural analysis of China from the 
formation of the People' s Republic of China in 1949. It uses a 
historical sociological methodology, on the basis of existing 
studies. It attempts to ascertain what has changed and what has 
stayed the same over the last fifty years, as well as to evaluate 
what Chinese families have gained and lost as a result of 
government reforms. With a different focus in each chapter, the 
study examines some of the ways the accelerated quest for 
modernity has impacted on the Chinese family and society. It 
explores family structure and the rapid changes currently taking 
place in dating, romance, and marriage, reproduction, child 
socialisation practices, and gender and family relationships. Far 
more than in most countries, the Chinese family plays a central 
role in economic relations and political ideology, which makes 
these changes especially consequential. One obvious impact of 
the government reforms on the Chinese family lifestyle was the 
preservation of traditional beliefs and practices, such as wedding 
and funeral ceremonies, ancestral worship and preferences for 
sons over daughters. Another impact discussed by this study has 
been the attempt to remake the Chinese family into an economic 
and social unit, depriving it of its traditional ideological, 
spiritual, and ritual significance. But the real challenge imposed 
by the current government, that may ultimately weaken or even 
fundamentally change the Chinese family, has been the birth 
control campaign. Socially and economically, this study shows 
that the well-being of many young couples especially rural 
couples, with only one daughter may be endangered when they 
could no longer carry out manual labour on their farm. The main 
conclusion from this analysis is that the family and its continuity 
still occupy the focal point in the lives of Chinese people. 
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The aim of this research is to investigate gender relations and the 
family in contemporary China. More specifically it seeks to 
contextualise the contemporary Chinese family within a socio-
historical, political and cultural analysis of China from the 
formation of the People's Republic of China in 1949. 
The study has the objectives of conducting research into 
gender relations and social changes within the Chinese family 
institution over the past 50 years, and of researching with a 
narrative mode in a historical sociological methodology, on the 
basis of existing studies. The research was conducted using this 
method, as it is useful for a critical study of the past, which looks 
for mechanisms through which societies change or reproduce 
themselves. Historical sociological studies highlight the 
particular and varying features of social structures and social 
change, which are extraordinarily difficult to capture solely 
through the use of empirical research methods. 
This study deals with the question, of to what extent can 
the Chinese state change family structure, family relations, and 
conceptions of family behaviour? In order to answer this 
question this investigation starts by exploring the historical 
changes in the institution of the family and its place in the 
Chinese social framework. It also examines the impact of 
Communism on Chinese families and their way of life. This 
trend is understandable since, at the start of its power in 1949, 
the Communist Government claimed to be establishing new 
social organizations and a new social ideology, drastically 
different from those of previous ages in order to elicit social 
change. Certainly the organisational capacity of the Communist 
Party, together with its revolutionary ideology, enabled it to 
penetrate further into everyday life of both rural and urban 
families than any previous regime had done. Furthermore it 
traces the responses of contemporary Chinese families to the 
macro-political and economic changes of reforms deemed 
necessary by Deng Xiaoping in his attempt to modernise China. 
The micro-dimensions of the research are defined by the data 
associated with the family and the home. This is then set against 
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the backdrop of a macro level understanding of power relations, 
to aid in our understanding of how Chinese families have 
changed over time. 
I have suggested using a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative approaches as a means of achieving the aims and 
objectives in this study. To a great extent a qualitative 
perspective has played a major role in this study because it is 
inherently a multi-methodological focus involving an 
interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject material (Handel, 
1992). But using empirical data as a general parameter, the study 
follows a historical, sociological perspective for an analysis of 
the major changes of constraining and incentive components, 
both structural and ideological, and assesses their roles in the 
process of societal change in China. 
A narrative technique has also been employed as a means 
of achieving aims and objectives in this qualitative socio-
historical research. It would be used as a frame for constructing 
the history-theory relationship. Using a narrative approach 
involves concurrent construction and mutual adjustment of 
history and of theory. It requires that we build history to 
correspond to explicitly theoretical tenns. It also requires that we 
build theory in a way that incorporates eventful as well as 
contextual time. Thus research framed by narrative constructs 
history as both "path-dependent" (defined as the contingent, yet 
cwnulative and constraining effects of past action on future 
possibilities; Aminzade, 1992), action sequence and as 
institutional and cultural conjuncture shaping action. Indeed, a 
narrative provides an overarching central frame for combining, 
extending and precisely operationa1ising central extant narrative 
and comparative techniques. 
To start this narrative I have used secondary sources to 
construct historical and sociological concepts and ideas against a 
general theoretical and comparative historical backdrop. 
Examining these concepts sets the stage for designing a broader 
research base to be executed in different themes of the study. 
Each theme combines examination of secondary sources with 
narrative and comparative logic to provide self-contained 
responses to specific theoretical questions. All phases together 
combine to respond to the full range of articulated theoretical 
issues that have been used to complete this study. 
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The socio-historical methodology used in this study 
supports the popularity of narrative as a term of art today 
because it signals the latest attempt to promote for sociology an 
explanatory form that follows Weber in seeking interpretive and 
sound understanding of historical happenings which are treated 
as valid objects of critical science inquiry. Narratives are 
sequential accounts. They organise material into chronological 
order to tell ' stories' about what happened (Stone, 1979). These 
accounts are conceptual wholes, built through selection and 
chronological linkage of other wise discrete parts, each of which 
then takes on meaning in light of the whole (Griffin, 1993). 
Adopting a narrative form requires the narrator to focus on 
individual, institutional, or collective actors; the actions they 
take; and when, where, why, how, and with what consequences 
they take them. Thus, explicitly or implicitly, narratives not only 
tell us what happened but they explain why it happened as it did 
and not otherwise. Because explanations built on narrative 
become appropriate and useful to the content that temporal 
ordering is crucial, it is no accident that historical sociologists 
are responsible for importing the construct of narrative from the 
humanities and transforming it to serve as an analytical tool for 
social science (Griffin, 1993; Abbott, 1992; Quadagno and 
Knapp, 1992: 481-507). 
HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY 
This section briefly explores some of the important dates, 
policies and phenomenon that have been important landmarks in 
Chinese history from Imperial times until the 1990s. These need 
explaining before the start of the study, in order to provide a 
historical landscape for the family changes that are being 
explored in this work. 
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
China experienced growing external pressure for change. 
Increased foreign trade, political intervention, urbanisation, and 
cultural contact pried open some parts of China's inward-looking 
social system and shifted the balance of power in different 
directions (Murphey, 1999: 55-59). Faced with imperialist 
expansion from Europe, America and Japan, which revealed 
China' s military weakness, China was drawn into wider 
international processes of economic and political power on very 
unfavourable terms. (Fairbank, 1979 213-263). Defeats in war 
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resulted in loss of territory (Hong Kong), loss of jurisdiction 
over urban districts called 'concessions,' and loss of control over 
customs administration, over foreign trading companies 
operating through Treaty Ports, and over foreign investment in 
crucial modem industries such as textiles and railways. This 
went far to damage the prestige and legitimacy of the Imperial 
Chinese regime (or Qing Dynasty 1644-1911 ), encouraging 
opposition movements and stimulating conflicts with the state 
elite over how to refonn the Chinese state, the better to cope 
with external challenges and internal divisions. Such 
humiliations were destined to continue and grow in scope for 
over a century (Murphey, 1999: 55-59). 
The May Fourth, Movement is named after a climactic 
student demonstration at Tiananmen Square (the Gate of 
Heavenly Peace in front of the Forbidden City in Beijing) on that 
date in 1919, passionately opposing the weak Chinese 
government's passive acceptance of humiliating concessions of 
Chinese territory to Japan in the Treaty of Versailles that 
concluded World War One. For students and writers, the 
demonstration represented the culmination of a groundswell of 
youthful anti-traditionalism represented by Chen Duxiu' s 
popular magazine New Youth ( Xin qingnian) , and the literary 
revolution sponsored by Hu Shi, by his promotion of writing 
forcefully and directly in the modem vernacular (Laughlin, 
1999: 373-377). Many of these intellectuals developed forceful 
arguments in favour of women' s rights. They also waged an all-
out war against the hierarchical notions of Confucianism and 
made bitter attacks on arranged marriage, restrictions on 
women's education and rigid family structures. 
Until the establishment in 1949 of the People's Republic 
of China (hereafter PRC) and its subsequent consolidation, 
China was the site of almost continuous and often violent 
struggles for power. All forms of power, economic, political and 
ideological, were actively contested in recurrent situations of 
great instability and uncertainty. In societies with stable power 
structures, contestation is usually held within strict limits by the 
knowledge of all participants as to where power lies by varying 
degrees of acceptance of its legitimacy. The collapse of the 
Imperial political institutions, and the establishment of the new 
republic in 1912, the sharpening of economic antagonisms, the 
challenge of new social beliefs and values, and the threat and 
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reality of external aggression, especially Japanese expansionism, 
all rendered such knowledge uncertain and undetermined 
legitimacy. Power could not be assumed, it had to be proved in 
practice, ultimately by resort to armed force (Spence, 1990). In 
Mao Zedong's words (1967, II: 224) "political power grows out 
of the barrel of a gun." 
After the collapse of the Imperial Empire, political power, 
the power to rule over the territory of China, dissolved. Attempts 
to establish coherent state institutions which could maintain 
control over the whole of the country failed. China fragmented 
into a large number of more or less fluid regimes dominated by 
military leaders, the so-called 'warlords' (Spence, 1990) warlord 
might dominate a whole province, but none had the resources to 
attempt the reunification of China under consolidated state rule. 
Two political movements, each with their own armed forces and 
their economic and social constituencies, competed with each 
other to achieve this task: the Guomindang (hereafter known as 
GMD), or the Nationalist Party, and the Chinese Communist 
Party (hereafter known as the CCP). Both were formed as 
revolutionary movements committed to revolutionary 
transformation of Chinese society. Like any large-scale social 
and political movement, they were composed of a large number 
of groupings with diverse views and goals, strategies and tactics 
(ibid). 
Holding each of them together despite this diversity was a 
conception of socialism. The CCP' s conception of socialism was 
essentially a Marxist one, as mediated through the Soviet Union 
and adapted to specific Chinese circumstances. The Nationalists' 
conception of socialism was enshrined in Sun Yat-sen's (he was 
the Provisional President of the Chinese Republic) 'Three 
Principles of the People,' one of which referred to the People's 
livelihood, jeopardised by the landlords' appropriation of rent, 
which the revolutionary state should restore to the people. In 
either case, revolutionary change would require the movement to 
wrest economic and political power from established classes and 
institutions. In both cases, however, their capacity to do this was 
restricted throughout the 1920s 1930s and 1940s, not only by the 
power of those established classes, but also by the competition 
and military confrontation between the revolutionary movements 
themselves, by the strength of local warlords, by the Japanese 
occupying forces in much of Eastern and Central China, and by 
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the leverage exercised by other foreign powers in return for aid 
in the struggle against the Japanese. Until the Communist victory 
in 1949, neither movement had the power to carry out a radical 
restructuring of society on more than a local scale (Gamer, 1999: 
67-75). 
The outcome of the unstable trilateral conflict between the 
Guomindang, the Communists and the Japanese and their 
diverse relationships with the economic power of propertied and 
un-propertied classes in urban and rural China, was settled by 
military force. The reasons for the Communist victory in the 
civil war (1946-1949) that followed the surrender of Japan are 
many and complex, and cannot be discussed here. Apart from 
the Nationalist retention of Taiwan, and the perpetuation of 
colonial rule in Hong Kong and Macao, the victory was total, 
and laid the political basis for a more thorough revolutionisation 
of the structure of power and social change than had been 
possible hitherto (ibid). 
The Communist approach to the family was in many ways 
radical, but it was always a part of the wider programme of 
social change, the underlying philosophy of which did not 
accord very much significance to the institution of the family. 
The government was primarily concerned to develop the 
economy, and to this end the hierarchically structured traditional 
family could be a useful means. The explicit family policy for 
the PRC was expressed in the Marriage Law of 1950, which 
aimed to replace the 'feudal' patriarchal marriage system of the 
old society with the 'new democratic' marriage system 'based on 
free choice of partners, monogamy, equal rights for both sexes 
and protection of lawful interests of women and children' 
(Meijer, 1971 ). The power of the state was to be used to shift the 
basis of family relationships away from the hierarchies of 
generation, age and sex to a more egalitarian model. 
The Land reform implemented in 1950 was intended to 
break the dominance of the landlord class in the countryside and 
to relieve rural poverty (Spence, 1990). At first, Mao returned 
lands to the peasants. Then he began forcing them to join 
production teams that became linked with larger communes to 
farm on a great scale. Mao Zedong envisioned communes as the 
basic cells of the People's Republic of China. Self containing 
and self sustaining complexes performing the roles of industry, 
agriculture, commerce, education, military and social life. What 
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happened during the brief period of the People's Commune 
Movement in the fall of 195 8 came closest to destroying the 
Chinese family institution. Small children were put in nurseries. 
Older children were assigned to brigades of Little Red Soldiers. 
All able-bodied adults were mobilised to join the communes and 
work in production teams. They were encouraged to dismantle 
their kitchens and contribute their cooking utensils to the 
communes. Family members, young and old had their meals in 
commune mess halls (Rae Yang, 1997). 
When Chu and Yannan Ju (1993 : 276), paid a visit to one 
of the villages in Qingpu in 1987 to make preparations for some 
anthropological fieldwork, they passed a deserted ramshackle 
building. Painted on its broken door were the fading characters 
of "People's Commune Mess Hall." Upon inquiry, these 
researchers were told that this was where people from the village 
went for their meals during the first few months of the commune 
movement. That commune experience proved to be a colossal 
human disaster. Within a matter of three months, the Party had 
to retreat from its utopian ideals of communal life and restored 
the Chinese family to its time honoured functions . 
The collectivisation of agriculture and rural industry 
began once land reform had been completed. Families were 
organised into larger and larger production groups to fann on a 
great scale. The height of this collectivisation came during the 
Great Leap Forward in 1958-1960, which called for 
simultaneous development of both agriculture and industry, both 
small and large industry - what Mao propagandists called 
"walking on two legs" (Jacka, 1997: 32). In rural areas, the 
"people' s communes" mobilised peasants en masse for large-
scale capital construction like building dams and irrigation 
systems as well as making iron and steel by indigenous methods 
(the so-called backyard furnaces) (Chang, 1991). Not just 
wasteful of resources these mass activities also resulted in a 
serious neglect of farming and cultivation. 
The Great Leap Forward collapsed in 1959 with disastrous 
economic consequences, particularly a dive in agricultural 
production and widespread food shortages in the countryside. 
The other party leaders tried to return to more traditional 
production methods, making industrial goods in factories and 
producing food on collectivised farms, but Mao was undaunted 
and unconvinced (Gamer, 1999: 109). In 1966 he tried again by 
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starting the Great Proletatrian Revolution, which he also used as 
a means of getting rid of his dissenting senior party colleagues, 
who he considered to be revisionist. Thus, millions of students 
were organised as Red Guards to attack the country's power 
structures, including government and party establishments. 
Virtually all senior party leaders except Zhou Enlai (senior 
member CCP) had been attacked or were purged at one time or 
another by the Red Guards (Rae Yang, 1997). 
Unlike the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution 
was primarily political in nature. In the economic arena, it 
merely emphasised certain ideological attributes in the overall 
economic development strategy such as "self-reliance," 
"ideology and politics to take precedence over economics," or 
"ideological incentive to be substitute for material incentive." 
Consequently, the Cultural Revolution brought much less direct 
disruption to economic production, though it resulted in long-
term economic damage to government administration and 
factory management (Murphey, 1999) 
The Cultural Revolution was believed to have inflicted 
wide-ranging damage on the Chinese family. During the height 
of this phase there were many cases when children were incited 
to accuse and denounce parents who were branded as counter-
revolutionaries. However according to Chu and Yannan Yu 
(1993: 27 5), even the denunciation of parents by young 
ideologues proved to a transient phenomenon. 
However, the Cultural Revolution did leave behind at least 
one positive legacy. Many old guards like Deng Xiaoping 
(senior member CCP) emerged from this nightmare to finally 
realise that politically and social stability is most crucial to 
economic development, where as incessant class struggle and 
ideological contention were inimical to economic growth. Thus, 
when Deng finally regained power, he was determined to open a 
new chapter in China's modern economic history, which he did 
by launching economic reform and the open-door policy in 
December 1978 (Wong, 1993). 
Opening the door to external economic forces became 
official at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee 
in December 1978. Since that time China has become 
increasingly incorporated into the international capitalist 
economy. Restrictions on foreign trade were relaxed by licensing 
several provinces and cities. To engage in foreign trade, 
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commercialising state trading agencies, and giving enterprises 
certain rights to retain foreign exchange earnings. China is now 
becoming one of the world's most important trading economies 
(Wong, 1999). 
After Mao's era ended, China was free to pursue the 
added elements of economic strength that had eluded it before; 
foreign capital, technology, and markets (Naughton, 1995). To 
implement reform, Deng called for 'four modernisations' - of 
agriculture, industry, defence and science and technology - and 
initiated new economic policies. 
The earliest transformations took place in agriculture. 
Between 1978 and 1984 agriculture was largely decollectivised. 
In place of the collective system of production teams fulfilling 
targets set by central planners and transmitted down through 
communes and brigades, there emerged the 'household 
responsibility system. ' The land of the teams was divided up 
among households, which contracted with the collective to farm 
a certain amount of land and to deliver a certain quantity of 
crops as a fee for using the land and as a tax, beyond which 
output could be sold on the market. Households thus once again 
became autonomous units of production and investment. The 
ownership of the land remained with the collective, though the 
length of time specified in contracts (usually fifteen years or 
longer) enabled long-term planning by households. By the 
middle 1980s China had seen the re-emergence of a family-
farming peasantry (Gamer, 1999: 110-112). 
The second Marriage Law of China was adopted in 1980 
and implemented on January 1 1981. It fixed the earliest 
marriage age for men at twenty-two and for women at twenty (it 
had been twenty and eighteen respectively in the 1950 Marriage 
Law). The laws recommended guidelines for women were first 
marriage at twenty-four, (and ideally last) childbirth at twenty-
five. Effective enforcement of the 1980 Marriage Law was 
crucial, since in many cases husbands could be forced to stop 
beating, and even torturing, their spouses only when brought into 
court. With the laws reassertion of the right of women to obtain 
divorce rose to about 5.5 percent of all marriages for 1983 (in 
1979 it had been 3.0 percent); over 70 percent of the divorce 
petitioners in 1983 were women. The 1980 Marriage Law also 
allowed divorced women greater chance to sue for the joint 
property one shared in marriage (Spence, 1990: 708). 
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One of the most profound ways in which the Chinese state 
has attempted to penetrate and police Chinese families, is in the 
sphere of fertility. The Communist regime headed by Deng 
Xiaoping in the late 1970s promised economic progress to the 
Chinese people, staking its legitimacy on its ability to achieve 
prosperity by century's end. Having seen rampant population 
growth eat up economic gains in the past, China' s leaders were 
convinced that their economic project would fail if it could not 
staunch the growth of the population, especially the rural 
component of it, which made up three-quarters of the total. The 
one-child policy which commenced in 1979 provided the 
solution to this problem (Spence, 1990: 683-690). 
CHAPTER OUTLINES 
In this section we will consider the organization of the seven 
chapters, and the themes that have been discussed in this study. 
Literature Review 
In Chapter One I will explore the range of literature that has 
been used to analyse the changes found in the Chinese family to 
date. 
Methodological Review 
Chapter Two is a methodological review, which briefly 
describes the chosen methodology, collection of materials, and 
problems encountered along the way. 
Changes in the Chinese Family 
China has often been seen as a familial society (coined to 
characterise Chinese social values and organisation), and 
Confucian social theory placed special emphasis on family 
relationships as the core of a stable and harmonious society. Yet 
in modem times the structures and functions of the Chinese 
family have come under vigorous attack. From the nineteenth 
century, the Chinese family was seen as an obstacle to 
modernisation of Chinese society, a backward-looking brake on 
the energies of the young, holding them in patterns of behaviour 
which led China into decline and defeat. Since then, the reform 
of the family has been a central focus of modem state policy; 
republican regimes, both bourgeois and socialist, established 
programmes to transform family life by legislation, compulsion 
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and incentive, programmes to which masses of ordinary Chinese 
people have had somehow to respond. At the same time, 
economic and cultural developments have led people to 
reconstruct their family life. Many women have attempted to 
redefine their family relationships with men and many young 
people have sought to recast their relationships with their elders. 
Chapter Three explores changes in the institution of the 
family and its place in the Chinese social framework. Its aim is 
to trace the changes experienced by the Chinese family from the 
beginning of the twentieth century until the 1990s. It is intended 
to provide a historical survey of the Chinese government's 
concrete reform programmes and how changes have affected the 
family during the period under consideration. 
Love, Marriage and Divorce in China 
As in most societies, marriage has always been an important 
institution in China and offers a unique window on social 
inequalities and change in any given historical period. In the 
past, the purposes of marriage were many and included the 
transfer of rights over the bride (Wolf and Huang, 1980: 73), 
continuance of a family line (Wolf, 1972: 72), a way to increase 
hands in the field (Croll, 1994), formation of alliances (Ebrey, 
1991 b: 5), a way to make a statement of class standing (Ebrey, 
199lb), provision of old age support and security (Potter and 
Potter, 1990: 202), and the transfer of resources from one family 
to another (Gates, 1996). The emphasis on any of these 
processes might depend on a number of factors including 
religion, class, life cycle of the family, and economic and 
political circumstances (Watson and Ebrey, 1991). 
The ethical basis for the establislunent of a family in 
contemporary China is switching from the family to the 
individual. The family was formerly considered a societal cell, 
and it was widely believed that family stability was an indicator 
of overall social stability. This ideology is no longer common, as 
greater emphasis is placed on individual happiness, and marriage 
is considered more a private affair. People do not force 
themselves to maintain an unhappy marriage, and divorce is no 
longer the discrimination it once was in the past. Women are not 
merely their husband's attachments or tools, but demand more 
emotional and sexual satisfaction, as well as rights within their 
marriage, in particular the right to enjoy more freedom 
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generally. Partners in marriage lacking in passion are no longer 
considered virtuous, and there are those who are sympathetic to 
extramarital love which at least involves genuine emotion. 
Chapter Four explores the husband and wife relationship, 
starting with the selection of a future spouse. It goes on to deal 
with this relationship in terms of what each partner expects of 
the other; how they interact in different domains of family life, 
and how marital conflicts are resolved. 
Gender Issues in the Chinese Family and Society 
The study of women in the Chinese family and society during 
the twentieth century must be viewed in the context of China's 
political movements and the challenge of transforming China 
from a disintegrating Imperial power into a modem nation. The 
most ambitious political transformations were introduced by the 
Communist Party when it took power in 1949. Unlike many 
other developing nations that have placed little or no priority on 
integrating women into development, China, under the 
leadership of the Communist Party, made explicit commitments 
to improving the status of women as part of its socialist agenda 
of promoting social and economic equality. 
China's long historical tradition of male dominance and 
patriarchal authority is deeply embedded in its culture and 
institutions and not easily overturned. For two and a half decades 
of heavy state planning and promotion of revolutionary 
egalitarian goals, there was much talk about equality between the 
sexes. Since Mao Zedong's death in 1976, the emphasis on 
gender equality has subsided, and liberalising reforms have 
permitted a return of market forces and revival of earlier cultural 
practices. The reforms have provoked concerns that old 
patriarchal patterns and abuses of women would resurface, and 
indeed, a more open society has allowed gender inequalities to 
become more visible. At the close of the twentieth century, 
critics in China and abroad strongly lament China's persisting 
structural inequalities and the unequal treatment of women both 
in the family system and the state sector (Croll, 1983; Honig and 
Hershatter, 1988; Johnson, 1983; Stacey, 1983; Wolf, 1985). 
Moreover, China's strict family planning policies, discussed in 
Chapter's Six and Seven, target women for control and place 
heightened pressure on women to give birth to sons (Greenhalgh, 
Zhu and Li, 1994; Greenhalgh and Li, 1995). As a result of strict 
20 
family planning quotas, the sex ratio of reported births in the 
1990s shows an increasing problem of "missing girls" - a clear 
sign that males and females are not treated equally. At the same 
time, increasing levels of female literacy, education, and 
urbanism, along with smaller families and greater economic 
autonomy, brings new benefits to women and may undermine 
patriarchal traditions even where earlier policies failed. 
When reviewing the twentieth century as a whole, there 
are many reasons to consider it to have been a century of 
significant, if not always revolutionary, change for women as 
well as men. These changes, toward modernity and greater 
equality and opportunity for women, continue to be contested by 
entrenched interests. From the perspective of a single lifetime, 
they may appear to be slow and to fall short of the revolutionary 
claims of the Maoist period, but from the perspective of several 
centuries the achievements of the twentieth may indeed be 
revolutionary. 
The aim in Chapter Five is to examine women's lives and 
the ways that gender has shaped the Chinese family and society. 
It begins by setting the historical context, which is the key in 
understanding Chinese women' s lives today. It then describes 
women's roles and position in contemporary social, political and 
economic life. The last half of the chapter is devoted to 
examining three aspects of Chinese society that reflect the shape 
of gender inequality in China in the 1990' s and suggest what 
might be expected in the future. Economic policies have been 
crucial in shaping key aspects of most women' s lives and have 
not only provided women with new opportunities but have also 
been a source of new forms of gender inequality. A second 
influence has been the commercialisation of women for sale -
and abuse on the open market. This section seeks to explore the 
sex and sexuality discourses in reform era China. Finally, we 
will discuss forms of discriminatory actions against women, 
including infanticide, trafficking of women and domestic abuse. 
Childbirth and Reproduction in China 
'May you have many sons' has long been a common felicitation 
and reference to sons or a son as 'the greatest of blessings' 
punctuate everyday language and ceremonial occasions, such as 
weddings. Customarily each generation of Chinese couples have 
been exhorted anew to have a son and continue the family line, 
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so that the greatest of unfilial acts has been the failure to produce 
a son and the most venomous of curses has been: 'May you die 
without sons.' Although such phrases are less likely to be openly 
articulated in present-day China, prestige and stature are still 
linked to sons and it is often said that the birth of a son causes a 
house 'to grow by three feet. (Croll, 2000: 71)' In contemporary 
China, with its stringent birth-control and single-child policies, 
the quest for sons has been magnified with the result that, in the 
absence of sons, the birth of a daughter not only remains a 
disappointment but more than ever before means a lost 
opportunity for a son. 
In China it is without doubt the importance of the family 
line and the permanent bonding of sons into chains of 
generations and networks of male kin which still underlies the 
unique status of sons, positioned as they are between ancestors 
and descendants (Baker, 1979). It has long been and still is 
according to Huang Shu-min (1998) the expectation that sons 
will worship and care for the ancestors of previous generations 
as only they can do while, in tum, sons have been exhorted since 
ancient times to have many sons to fulfil their own obligations to 
their father and their father's lineage. Each new generation of 
sons is expected to continue the line of descent and, simply put, 
without sons signifying the unbroken continuity of the family 
line, there is said to be no bridge between family past and family 
future. It is sons as sole performers of ancestral rites, who are 
responsible for the welfare of their departed forebears in the 
spirit world (ibid). 
But it was not just beliefs about the family line or the 
ritual support of the dead that underlay son preference, for 
parents also remain almost entirely reliant on a son's support in 
old age, both in the countryside and to a lesser but still important 
degree in the cities. Sons are not only for dreaming and 
descendants, for in very practical ways they represent prosperity, 
future security and even survival in old age. This has been so in 
ages past and is still so, despite a minimal safety net for the very 
poorest and the remnants of an urban pension scheme. The 
absence of a pension system in China's rural villages and the 
uneven distribution and declining pension support in cities have 
meant that today sons are still perceived to be the most important 
source of support in old age by both men and women (Potter and 
Potter, 1990). 
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In Chapter Six the aim is to focus on the socio-cultural 
meaning of reproduction in Chinese society, in order to explore 
the importance of the preferred male child. To explain this 
preference, I will deal with the concern about security of old age 
as well as a characteristic of Chinese culture that seems at first 
unrelated to reproduction - ancestor worship. In a way, this 
means I have to deal with the opposite of birth, i.e., death. This 
is an essential task, if we are to grasp the meaning of 
reproduction to Chinese people, and to understand its changed as 
well as unchanged traits. 
Impact of the One-Child Policy in China 
It is well known that China is the most populous country of the 
world. On February 15 1995, the government announced that its 
population had reached 1.2 billion - about one fifth of the total 
world's population which stood a 5.5 billion in 1993 (Ma Rong, 
1999: 210). As the population pressure on land, urban jobs, 
housing and social spending became more serious, it was clear 
that a rapidly growing population would make the "four 
modernisations (the goal of which was to transform China into a 
powerful and modem socialist society by developing four sectors 
of the economy: agriculture, industry, the military, science and 
technology) announced in 1978 an impossible dream. So in 1979 
the Chinese government finally set up a more restrictive birth 
control policy, the one-child campaign (Greenhalgh, 1994). 
The importance of family planning becomes even clearer 
if we carefully examine the connection between natural 
resources in China and population growth. Arable land in China 
covers less than 250 million acres (101.2 hectares) and has 
continually decreased because of urban expansion and 
construction of dams, roads, bridges and new factories. The 
arable land per capita in 1991 was 0.27 acres (0.11 hectares) in 
China, one-ninth that of the United States, one-thirty-fourth that 
in Australia (Edmonds, 1999: 237-266). The Chinese 
government argues that, with 7 percent of the world's arable 
land and the need to feed 22 percent of the world's population, 
there was no other choice for China to maintain it social stability 
and proceed into modernisation except practicing family 
planning. 
The outlook for other natural resources in China is equally 
grim. Only 13 percent of China's territory has forest cover, the 
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indicator of area per capita is even lower. Water is one of the 
most important natural resources. The per capita surface run off 
- the amount of water that flows on the surface to use for 
drinking, agriculture, sanitation, and industry is only one-fourth 
the world average. Furthermore, China' s water resources are 
unequally distributed. Most of the cities in Northern China 
experience serious water shortages, whereas South-eastern China 
is often threatened by floods (Edmonds, 1999: 237-266). 
With such shortages and imbalanced geographic 
distribution between population and natural resources, birth 
control and family planning are necessary measures. Wong 
(1999: 103-140) discusses Brown' s concerns that China will be 
unable to feed itself and the growing consensus that although 
Brown' s fears may be overblown, the difficulties of increasing 
food production for a growing population are substantial. 
Though ample food does not automatically bring population 
increases (Harris and Ross, 1987; Gates 1996: 54-60), history 
has shown that when the Chinese have enough to eat, their 
population grows. If it keeps growing, food supply might not be 
able to keep up with the population, and money would have to 
be diverted from other projects to import food. 
Chapter Seven examines the impact of family policy on 
family structure and socialisation processes in China. The aim is 
to examine the factors leading to overpopulation in China, 
describe the governments strenuous efforts to solve the problem 
by issuing a one-child mandate, and analyse its immediate 
impact on individual family life, the developing child, the family 
structure and parental practices. Clearly, a revolution in family 
life and parental practices is taking place in China. The after 
effects echo throughout the political and social structure of the 
earth's most populous nation, with enormous impact on the 
Chinese people' s economic and well-being and quality of life. 
This revolution even influences the quality of the armed forces . 
In effect, development of the one-child policy has created the 
need for consequent policy shifts in areas earlier thought 
unrelated to the policy as originally construed. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined the aims and objectives of this 
research, briefly explored some of the important dates, policies 
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and phenomenon in Chinese history and considered the 
organization and themes of the study. 
